The central political issue in American politics during the 1990s is the need for political campaign reform. Regens and Gaddie argue that spending limits, contribution limits, and public financing proposals will not necessarily have the impact expected by advocates. The final fate of reform rests with self-interested incumbents who will design reform.

A central political issue in American politics during the 1990s is the need for political campaign reform. A variety of proposals have been advanced to reform the system of congressional elections, most notably in relation to campaign financing. The authors examine U.S. Senate elections to determine the role money plays in the contests; their analysis indicates that the system of campaign finance resembles a market, with legislators serving as the recipients of financial largesse based on their institutional positions and political vulnerability. This rent-seeking relationship between economic interests and legislators has transformed the dynamic of Senate elections. Assessing the potential impact of several electoral reform proposals, Professors Regens and Gaddie argue that debates over the nature and consequences of proposed changes in election finance are often waged without an underlying point of theoretical reference. In addition, little consideration is placed upon impacts relative to each other or collectively on the political system. Spending limits and public funding proposals, they contend, will not have the effects expected by reform advocates. Term limit and public funding proposals would disrupt the rent-seeking relationship between legislators and economic interests, and these proposals would also face political and constitutional barriers to implementation.